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CHILD WELFARE-OTSIDE THE INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE
PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN-PLACEMENT OF A CHILD WITH A
NATURAL PARENT
McComb v. Wambaugh (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
Parens patriae is a power that is ascribed to states to act as guardian
in order to care for those who cannot care for themselves.' The Inter-
state Compact on the Placement of Children (the Compact) is an exam-
ple of this power.2 The Compact was developed in the late 1950s to
help member states protect children who are placed in interstate foster
care and adoption.3 One of the primary concerns of the drafters of the
Compact, and a fairly typical parental concern, was ensuring that a child
received proper care, support and supervision following his or her trans-
fer from a sending state's custody to a home in a receiving state.4
Recently, in McComb v. Wambaugh,5 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit placed a limit on a Compact state's parens
patriae role. The McComb court held that the terms of the Compact do
not apply where the child is placed in the custody of a natural parent. 6
This limitation on the Compact's scope is a logical one because it is the
customary role of a natural parent, and not a state, to protect a minor
child. 7 In certain circumstances, however, the McComb holding may
seem unfair.
1. The phrase parens patriae literally means "parent of the country."
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
2. Bernadette W. Hartfield, The Role of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children in Interstate Adoption, 68 NEB. L. REV. 292, 297 (1989). The Compact was
designed to facilitate placements that "safeguard the interests of the child" and
allow states to properly discharge their "legal responsibility . . . to protect the
interests of the child." Id.
3. Id. at 295. Concerns leading to the development of the Compact were
threefold: (1) failure of existing statutes to provide protection to children
moved interstate; (2) territorial limitations of states' jurisdiction that left states
unable to ensure that children received proper care and supervision in a receiv-
ing state; and (3) lack of a means by which to compel a receiving state to provide
necessary care. Id.
4. Id. A study of interstate placement problems identified three main con-
cerns to be addressed by the Compact, including "the powerlessness of the state
from which the child was sent to ensure that proper care and supervision were
provided in another state." Id.
5. 934 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1991).
6. Id. at 482.
7. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) ("Children, by definition, are
not assumed to have the capacity to take care of themselves. They are assumed
to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control fails, the
state must play its part as parens patriae.").
(896)
1
Butler: Child Welfare - Outside the Interstate Compact on the Placement o
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
1992] THIRD CIRCUr REVIEW 897
. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
When plaintiff Khemsu Walton (Khemsu) was only two weeks old, a
Virginia hospital found that he was malnourished.8 Following an inves-
tigation, the local Virginia domestic relations court removed Khemsu
and his four siblings from the custody of their natural mother, Marie
Walton (Walton).9 Khemsu was subsequently placed in foster care with
his aunt and uncle in Virginia.' 0
Walton regained custody of Khemsu following two years of separa-
tion."1 In placing Khemsu with his mother, both Virginia and Penn-
sylvania followed the Compact's guidelines.' 2 The Virginia court
required an investigation of the Walton home prior to Khemsu's re-
turn.13 The Virginia court also requested that the Philadelphia Depart-
ment of Public Works (DPW) provide quarterly reports on Khemsu
8. McComb, 934 F.2d at 476. Marie Walton and her children were involved
in a car accident while visiting relatives in Virginia. Id. The family was taken to a
local hospital for treatment, and the hospital discovered that all five of Walton's
children were malnourished. Id.
9. Id. The Domestic Relations Court of Halifax County, Virginia removed
all five of Walton's children from her custody. Id. The children were placed in
the temporary custody of the Halifax County Department of Social Services. Id.
10. Id. Walton returned to her home in Philadelphia, but her children re-
mained in Virginia. Id.
11. Id. at 477. The Halifax County court granted Walton custody of
Khemsu and his older brother on April 27, 1982. Id.
12. Id. at 476-77. The Third Circuit's decision, however, obviated the need
for following the Compact's guidelines when a child is placed with his or her
natural parent. Id. at 482. The Third Circuit held that "the Compact does not
apply when a child is returned by the sending state to a natural parent residing
in another state." Id. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding and analy-
sis in McComb, see infra notes 50-76 and accompanying text.
13. McComb, 934 F.2d at 477. The Compact permits the sending state to
"obtain the most complete information on the basis of which to evaluate a pro-
jected placement before it is made." VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-219.2 (Michie
1991). This information may include home studies and a formal evaluation of
the proposed placement by a child welfare agency or facility. Cathleen Tucker,
Interstate Compact Protects Children, 12 FAM. ADvoc., Fall 1989, at 26, 42.
After Marie Walton petitioned the Domestic Relations Court of Halifax
County, Virginia, county social workers requested information about her from a
local Pennsylvania agency. McComb, 934 F.2d at 476. The Philadelphia Depart-
ment of Public Welfare (DPW) was responsible for fulfilling this request. Id.
DPW recommended the return of the Walton children after conducting one an-
nounced visit to the Walton home. Id. In October 1981, the Virginia court re-
turned custody of the three oldest children to Walton, subject to continued
supervision by the Department of Social Services of Philadelphia. Id. DPW con-
ducted two additional announced visits to Walton's home and found the chil-
dren in good health. Id. Jean Summons, a DPW social worker and a McComb
defendant, then recommended to the Virginia court that Khemsu and an older
brother also be returned to Walton. Id. As in the previous custody order, the
Virginia court made Khemsu's return contingent upon the continued supervi-
sion of Philadelphia's Department of Social Services. Id. at 477.
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following his return to the Walton home. 14 The Virginia judge signed
the necessary Interstate Compact Application Child Placement Request
and the custody order on April 27, 1982.15 A Virginia social worker
then accompanied Khemsu and his younger brother to Philadelphia,
where they rejoined their mother. 16 In May, the Pennsylvania Compact
authorities approved the placement request. 17
In theory, this approval permitted the Virginia court to retain juris-
diction and monitoring capabilities. 18 Virginia attempted to supervise
Khemsu's case, but Walton refused to cooperate with the Philadelphia
DPW and disallowed any further home visits. 19 Neither Pennsylvania
nor Virginia authorities pursued the case any further.2 0
When Khemsu was four years old, Walton brought him to a Phila-
14. McComb, 934 F.2d at 477. The Virginia court requested reports on all
five Walton children. Id.
15. Id. The judge's placement application was made later than normal.
Typically, the sending state relays the Compact application in order to generate
the preliminary reports on the proposed placement home. Tucker, supra note
13, at 42. In McComb, reports on the Walton home had already been generated
and received by the Virginia court. McComb, 934 F.2d at 476.
Each Compact member state has a "compact administrator" who oversees
administration of the Compact in his or her respective state. Tucker, supra note
13, at 26. The Compact administrator "act[s] as a clearinghouse for all referrals
of interstate placements." Id. Customarily, the Compact administrators of the
sending and receiving states determine the type of monitoring that will be done.
Id. at 42.
In Khemsu's case, Virginia requested quarterly reports. McComb, 934 F.2d
at 477. The reports filed by the Pennsylvania DPW prior to Khemsu's return
addressed the condition of the Walton home, the health of the three oldest Wal-
ton children, and the children's school attendance. Id. at 476. After Khemsu
and his brother were returned to Walton, however, the Pennsylvania Compact
administrator notified the Virginia administrator that Pennsylvania would not
provide the quarterly reports that Virginia had requested and instead would
provide only semi-annual reports. Id. at 477.
16. McComb, 934 F.2d at 477.
17. Id. Placement of a child is approved by the receiving state, here Penn-
sylvania, if "the proposed placement does not appear to be contrary to the inter-
ests of the child." 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. III (d) (Supp. 1992).
18. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. V(a) ("The sending agency shall
retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine all matters in relation to
the custody, supervision, care, treatment and disposition of the child ....").
19. McComb, 934 F.2d at 477. Philadelphia DPW policy requires prear-
ranged home visits. Id. at 476. DPW informed a Halifax County social worker of
Walton's refusal to cooperate after the social worker requested progress reports
in October 1982 and February 1983. Id. at 477.
20. Id. at 477. In a letter to the Pennsylvania Compact administrator, de-
fendant Jean Summons, a Philadelphia DPW social worker, explained the
problems they were having with Walton and stated that "if Virginia wants us to
make another attempt to investigate Ms. Walton, please have them notify us in
writing." Id. (quoting letter ofJean Summons to Pennsylvania Compact admin-
istrator). No evidence indicates that the Virginia authorities responded to this
letter. Id.
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delphia hospital.2 1 At that time, he weighed thirteen pounds. 2 2 Due to
the severity of his malnourishment, Khemsu sustained irreparable brain
damage.2 3
B. Plaintiff's Argument
Khemsu Walton, represented by his guardian ad litem David Mc-
Comb, brought suit for injuries he suffered after being returned to the
custody of his natural mother. 24 Khemsu sought damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.25 He alleged that the defendants "failed to evaluate
properly Marie Walton's capacity to care adequately for her children,
failed to perform visits as required by the Compact and the Virginia
court order, and displayed deliberate indifference to Khemsu's constitu-
tional rights."'2 6 Essentially, Khemsu sought damages against the city
and its employees for failure to protect him from his mother. 2 7
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.2 8 The
district court found that because the Compact is inapplicable when a
child is returned to his or her natural parent, any custodial relationship
between the Virginia court and Khemsu ended when he was returned to
his mother. 29 Therefore, the Virginia court had no authority to order
21. Id.
22. Id. At the time Khemsu was hospitalized, he had been in his mother's
custody for more than two years. Id. Over fifteen months had passed since the
Pennsylvania DPW's last communication with the Virginia Compact authorities.
Id.
23. Id. The Third Circuit noted that Walton "plead[ed] guilty to criminal
charges arising out of her failure to provide properly for Khemsu," who now
lives in foster care. Id.
24. Id. Khemsu named as defendants the City of Philadelphia and seven
members (four commissioners and three social workers) of the Philadelphia
DPW. Id. at 474.
25. Id. at 477. This federal statute provides that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
26. McComb, 934 F.2d at 477. Khemsu's attorneys argued that the defend-
ants' failure to provide these services constituted a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Id.
27. Id. at 476.
28. Id. The motion for summary judgment was decided byJudgeJ. William
Ditter, Jr. Id.
29. Id. at 477. The district court found that the Virginia court relinquished
formal custody to Walton in its April 27, 1982 court order. Id. The Virginia
court had ordered the return of Khemsu to Walton's custody, but it had quali-
fied its order by requiring the "continuing supervision of the appropriate De-
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Philadelphia officials to supervise Khemsu.3 0 Additionally, the district
court found that the Compact did not create an entitlement to or a lib-
erty interest in freedom from his mother's mistreatment.3 ' As a result,
the court held that it was bound by the Supreme Court's ruling in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.32 In DeShaney,
the Court held that "a State's failure to protect an individual against
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause." 3 3
On appeal, Khemsu's argument focused upon an exception to the
DeShaney rule.3 4 In DeShaney, the Court recognized that "in certain lim-
ited circumstances the Constitution imposes upon the State affirmative
duties of care and protection with respect to particular individuals." 3 5
The Court has defined limited circumstances as those where "the State
partment of Social Services in Philadelphia, Pa." Id. (quoting Virginia court
order).
30. Id. The district court found that the custodial relationship between the
Virginia court and Khemsu was legally terminated on April 27, 1982, the date
the court signed the order returning custody of Khemsu to his mother. Id.
31. Id.
32. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
33. Id. at 197. In DeShaney, Joshua DeShaney and his mother brought suit
against Winnebago County, its Social Services Department (SSD) and various
individual SSD employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 193. Joshua
DeShaney, like Khemsu Walton, was four years old when he suffered severe,
irreparable brain damage. Id. Joshua's brain damage resulted from a number of
brain hemorrhages caused by his father's beatings. Id. Joshua's father, Randy
DeShaney, was subsequently convicted of child abuse. Id. The Social Services
Department had notice thatJoshua might be a victim of child abuse. Id. at 192.
For two years, the SSD monitored the DeShaney home. Id. at 192-93. During
this time, Joshua went to the hospital emergency room three times with suspi-
cious injuries, and the SSD was contacted each time. Id. The SSD, however,
took no action. Id. at 193.
The Court found that Joshua had no recourse against the defendants under
the Due Process Clause because "nothing in the language of the Due Process
Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors." Id. at 195. Instead, the Court found
that the Due Process Clause acts as a limitation on the states' power to infringe
on individual rights, not as a guarantee of "minimal levels of safety and secur-
ity." Id.
34. McComb, 934 F.2d at 478-79.
35. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198. This DeShaney exception is commonly re-
ferred to as the "special relationship" exception. Id. at 197.
In McComb, Khemsu argued that, taken together, the Compact and the Vir-
ginia court order created a special relationship between him and the Philadel-
phia defendants that brought him within the exception to the DeShaney rule.
McComb, 934 F.2d at 478-79. The Third Circuit, however, held that the Virginia
court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the Philadelphia DPW social workers,
which was necessary for its court order to be enforceable. Id. at 482.
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit believed that the Virginia court could have
retained jurisdiction by invoking the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA). Id. Both Pennsylvania and Virginia are parties to the UCCJA. See 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5341-5366 (Supp. 1991) (adopting UCCJA); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 20-125 to -146 (Michie 1990) (same). For a further discussion of the
900 [Vol. 37: p. 896
5
Butler: Child Welfare - Outside the Interstate Compact on the Placement o
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty
that it renders him unable to care for himself . 3..."36 For example, the
Court has required a state to provide adequate medical care to incarcer-
ated prisoners.3 7
Except in extremely limited circumstances, the Supreme Court re-
mains unwilling to subject a state to liability for its failure to protect
private citizens. 38 The DeShaney case is an excellent example of the
Court's reluctance to find a state liable where harm has been inflicted by
a private actor. 39 The local social services department was aware that
Joshua DeShaney was possibly an abused child.40 In fact, a social
worker who had visited the DeShaney home approximately twenty times
later commented: "I just knew the phone would ring some day and
Joshua would be dead."' 4 1 Despite the social services department's close
contact with the DeShaney situation, the Court refused to hold the de-
fendants, Winnebago County and its social workers, liable for violating
Joshua's substantive due process rights. Instead, the Court concluded
that "[tihe most that can be said of the state functionaries in this case is
that they stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dic-
tated a more active role for them."'4 2
Despite the factual similarities between the DeShaney case and his
own case, Khemsu argued that his suit was more analogous to Stoneking
possible impact of the UCCJA on the McComb case, see infra notes 95-105 and
accompanying text.
36. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200. An analogous theory has been utilized by the
Third Circuit. See, e.g., Stoneking v. Bradford Area Sch. Dist., 882 F.2d 720, 725
(3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990) (allowing high school student
sexually abused by teacher to maintain viable § 1983 claim against school offi-
cials where officials "with deliberate indifference to the consequences, estab-
lished and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused her
constitutional harm").
More recently, the Supreme Court held that a public school may be held
liable for monetary damages under Title IX where a high school teacher alleg-
edly sexually harassed and abused a student. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub.
Sch., 112 S. Ct. 1028, 1029-32 (1992). In Franklin, school teachers and adminis-
trators also allegedly failed to take any action to stop the teacher in question and
discouraged the student from filing charges. Id. at 1029.
37. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976); see also Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982) (unconstitutional to confine involuntarily
committed mental patient under unsafe conditions).
38. See, e.g., DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195 (Supreme Court unwilling to find
liability where minor child injured by his father, a private citizen).
39. Id. at 202. The Court commented that "the State had no constitutional
duty to protect Joshua against his father's violence [and], its failure to do so-
though calamitous in hindsight-simply does not constitute a violation of the
Due Process Clause." Id. For a more detailed description of the DeShaney facts,
see supra note 33.
40. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192-93.
41. Id. at 209 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 300 (7th Cir. 1987)).
42. Id. at 203.
1992]
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v. Bradford Area School District 4 3 than to DeShaney.44 In Stoneking, the
Third Circuit held that a school district could be liable under section
1983 for maintaining a policy of deliberate indifference toward alleged
sexual abuse by a teacher. 4 5 Khemsu argued that the Philadelphia de-
fendants similarly maintained "policies deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of the children" whom they had a duty to protect. 46
The Third Circuit, however, held that Stoneking was inapposite because
Stoneking's alleged injuries resulted from the actions of a state em-
ployee (a high school teacher) while Khemsu's injuries occurred at the
hands of a private actor, his mother.4
7
Khemsu then argued that he satisfied the DeShaney exception be-
cause a special relationship existed between the Philadelphia defendants
and himself.48 Khemsu maintained that the Compact extended Vir-
ginia's jurisdiction to Philadelphia and imposed legal duties on the city
and its employees to protect and preserve Khemsu's constitutional
rights.4 9 For his argument to prevail, Khemsu was required to show that
the Virginia court vested its custodial supervision granted by the Com-
43. 882 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1044 (1990).
44. McComb, 934 F.2d at 477-78. On appeal, Khemsu argued that DeShaney
was not on point because the defendants in his case had "adopted and imple-
mented policies deliberately indifferent to the constitutional rights of children
whom the agency was charged to protect." Id. at 477. This theory of liability
has been recognized by the Third Circuit in Stoneking. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725.
For a discussion of the Stoneking holding, see infra note 45 and accompanying
text.
45. Stoneking, 882 F.2d at 725. The Stoneking court held that the plaintiff
could maintain her § 1983 claim because she "alleged that defendants, with de-
liberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy,
practice or custom which directly caused her constitutional harm." Id. Stoneking
was decided after the Supreme Court remanded the case to allow the Third Cir-
cuit to reconsider its decision in light of DeShaney. Id. at 721. The Third Circuit
distinguished the causes of action in Stoneking and DeShaney on the ground that
"[iliability of municipal policymakers for policies or customs chosen or reck-
lessly maintained is not dependent upon the existence of a 'special relationship'
between the municipal officials and the individuals harmed." Id. at 725.
46. McComb, 934 F.2d at 477.
47. Id. at 478. The Third Circuit commented that "[t]he distinction be-
tween harm inflicted by a state agent and injury caused by a private individual is
critical." Id. In fact, because Khemsu's injuries were inflicted by his mother, a
private actor, the Third Circuit found that Khemsu's circumstances "mirror
those in DeShaney and differ dispositively from those in Stoneking." Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. Khemsu claimed "that the Virginia court order, together with the
Interstate Compact ... created a special relationship between Philadelphia and
Khemsu within the exception outlined in DeShaney. . . . [This special relation-
ship] extended the jurisdiction of the Virginia court into Philadelphia so as to
impose legal obligations on the City's social workers." Id. at 478. The Third
Circuit, however, held that the Virginia court did not have the necessary in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the Philadelphia officials to make its order a legal direc-
tive in Philadelphia. Id. at 482.
902 [Vol. 37: p. 896
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pact in the Philadelphia defendants, thus creating the necessary special
relationship. This question was the focus of the McComb court's analysis.
III. ANALYSIS
The question facing the Third Circuit was whether the Compact ap-
plied where a court in a sending state placed a child with his or her
natural parent residing in a different state.50 Although other courts had
addressed this question, it was one of first impression before the Third
Circuit.5 ' Lacking Pennsylvania case law guidance, the McComb court
50. Id. at 479.
51. Id. ("No state Supreme Court has analyzed the question in a reasoned
opinion, nor has any state appellate court."). Pennsylvania law on the Compact
is virtually nonexistent. Only two Pennsylvania cases have mentioned the Com-
pact, but neither case expressly discussed it. See In re K.S., 581 A.2d 659 (Pa.
Super. 1990) (natural father claimed Pennsylvania court had jurisdiction to de-
termine custody under terms of the Compact; court declined jurisdiction on al-
ternative grounds); In re B.E.W.G., 549 A.2d 1286 (Pa. Super. 1988)
(grandparents seeking to set aside custody agreement entered into by natural
father claimed father failed to comply with terms of Compact; decree set aside
on other grounds). The lack of litigation on the Compact is somewhat surpris-
ing given that Pennsylvania adopted the Compact in 1967. 62 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 761 (Supp. 1992).
The Third Circuit stated that it was unable to find any state intermediate
appellate or supreme court decisions regarding the issue. McComb, 934 F.2d at
479. At least five courts, however, have addressed the question. Three courts
favor application of the Compact to the placement of a child with a natural par-
ent. See Custody of Quincy, 562 N.E.2d 94, 96 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (holding
that Compact should have been applied when state placed child with natural
father living in a different state); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of Clackamas County
v. Smith, 811 P.2d 145, 147 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that Compact applies
when child placed with mother living out-of-state); In re J.H., 587 A.2d 1009,
1010 (Vt. 1991) (holding that Compact applies when state places child in cus-
tody of mother living in another state). One court would apply the Compact to
placement with natural grandparents. See In reJ.M.L., 466 So. 2d 571, 572-73
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that placement of children with grandparents
who live out of state must comply with Compact). One court opposes applica-
tion of the Compact to placement with natural parents. See In re Mary L., 778
P.2d 449, 453 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that "Article 8 of the Compact
expressly exempts from the placement requirements relinquishment of children
to a natural parent in another state").
Three state attorney generals have issued opinions advising that the Com-
pact is applicable to placement with natural parents. See 61 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen.
535 (1978) ("Except for the prior notice provisions in article 3 of the Compact,
the Compact applies when the juvenile court places a child with a parent in an-
other Compact state."); Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 88-4 (1988) (sending state retains
jurisdiction over child sent out of state to natural parents as "[t]here is nothing
in the term 'family free home' which indicates that the home of any particular
family or family member is to be excluded"); 52 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 97 (1983)
("The child may not be returned to the custody of his parents except as the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children provides."); cf. Op. Ohio Att'y
Gen. 89-092 (1989) (sending state has duty to bear cost of out-of-state public
education for child placed out-of-state with relative).
Massachusetts and Oregon courts have expressly recognized that the Com-
pact applies to placement of a child with a natural parent. See Quincy, 562
8
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relied on an analysis of the text of the Compact and regulations promul-
N.E.2d at 96; Smith, 811 P.2d at 147 n.4. The Massachusetts court commented
that "when a child who is the subject of an ongoing care and protection case is
placed with the agreement and participation of [one state] in another State, the
Interstate Compact should be followed to insure that services and treatment
continue until they are determined to be no longer necessary." Quincy, 562
N.E.2d at 96. Two weeks prior to McComb decision, the Oregon court held that
"[t]he compact does apply to a child who is sent to another state for placement
with parents or relatives, when someone other than a parent or relative makes
the placement." Smtih, 811 P.2d at 147 n.4. In either of these jurisdictions,
Khemsu's placement would have been covered by the Compact, and therefore
the special relationship required to impose liability on the receiving state (Penn-
sylvania) would have been established.
Additionally, the Vermont Supreme Court has implicitly recognized the ap-
plicability of the Compact to placement with a natural parent. See In reJ.H., 587
A.2d at 1009-10. Four months prior to McComb, the Vermont court found that
the Vermont social services department properly requested a home study from
its New York counterpart under the Compact where a mother residing in New
York state petitioned Vermont for the return of her child. Id. at 1010. The
approach of the Virginia court in McComb paralleled the holdings of the Oregon,
Massachusetts and Vermont courts and reveals a belief that the Compact gov-
erns the placement of a child with his or her natural parent. See McComb, 934
F.2d at 476-77 (Virginia court followed Compact when returning custody of five
Walton children to natural mother, including signing Interstate Compact Appli-
cation Child Placement Request for each child).
A Florida district court has held that the placement of two children with
their grandparents, residents of Georgia, was subject to the Compact. In re
J.M.L., 466 So. 2d 571, 572-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). Previously, however,
the same appellate court took a different, novel approach to the McComb issue.
See In re M.W., 424 So. 2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). In In re M.W., a Florida
juvenile court had granted custody of a child to her natural parents who resided
in Texas. Id. at 57. The court held that "by granting legal custody, the [lower]
court in effect entered an order dissolving M.W.'s dependency status .... It
follows, therefore, that M.W.'s case was removed from the proscriptions of the
Interstate Compact as the child was no longer one 'requiring placement' for its
protection." Id. If the Florida court's reasoning was applied to McComb, the
Virginia court's grant of custody to Marie Walton would have dissolved
Khemsu's dependency status under the Compact and left him unprotected by its
terms. Any grant of custody, however, "dissolves" a child's dependency status
with respect to the sending state because the child's custody shifts to another
entity. Therefore, applying the Florida court's reasoning would eviscerate the
Compact, specifically Article V, which addresses retention of jurisdiction by a
sending agency such as a state. For a discussion of Article V of the Compact, see
infra notes 58 & 65-66 and accompanying text.
A New Mexico court of appeals case supports the Third Circuit's position.
See In re Mary L., 778 P.2d at 453 ("Article 8 of the Compact expressly exempts
from the placement requirements relinquishment of children to a natural parent
in another state.") For a discussion of a similar interpretation of Article VIII of
the Compact by the McComb court, see infra notes 59 & 67-69.
The In re Mary L. holding, however, is distinguishable because in that case
the New Mexico Human Services Department (HSD) had never established the
superiority of its custody over the mother's claim. In re Mary L., 778 P.2d at 452.
In this case, a mother had previously lost custody of her children after her di-
vorce from the children's natural father. Id. at 450-51. The father, in turn, con-
sented to relinquish custody to the HSD following allegations (later proved) of
sexual abuse of the children. Id. at 451. The mother was never notified of the
consent custody decree. Id. While the mother's custody rights were extin-
904 [Vol. 37: p. 896
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gated by the Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on
the Placement of Children.5 2
guished as against the father, her rights were still superior to those of the state.
Id. at 452. As a result, the state lacked the custodial power to "place" the chil-
dren with their mother. Id. at 452-53.
52. McComb, 934 F.2d at 479-82. Interpretation of the Compact is a matter
of state law. Id. at 479. Generally, an interstate compact is an agreement be-
tween states that is enacted by statute in member states. Hartfield, supra note 2,
at 294. An interstate compact allows member states to address common
problems that transcend state boundaries. PAUL T. HARDY, INTERSTATE COM-
PACTS: THE TIES THAT BIND 2 (1982). The United States Constitution ad-
dressed such agreements by stating that "[n]o state shall, without the Consent of
Congress .... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10(3). Despite the Constitution's literal language, however,
Congress has only required its consent for those compacts that infringe on fed-
eral powers, i.e. contracts that tend to expand state powers at a cost to the fed-
eral government's power. McComb, 934 F.2d at 479 (congressional consent is
unnecessary where agreement is not "directed to the formation of any combina-
tion tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States") (citing United
States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452, 468 (1978)); accord
Hartfield, supra note 2, at 294.
The Compact has not been subject to federal approval because it addresses
adoption and foster care, areas that have traditionally been left to state control.
Hartfield, supra note 2, at 294-95; accord HARDY, supra, at 16 (noting that child
welfare, as well as mental health, criminal law and education, are "traditional
state areas that do not require congressional consent" to interstate laws).
Therefore, the Compact is not federal law, and is thus construed as state law.
McComb, 934 F.2d at 479. Congressional approval would only be required to
approve Canadian participation in the Compact should Canada or one of its
provinces decide to join. Hartfield, supra note 2, at 295.
The Association of Administrators of the Interstate Compact on the Place-
ment of Children (the Association of Administrators) is comprised of the indi-
vidual Compact administrators from each state that is a party to the Compact.
Id. at 301. A Compact administrator is responsible for coordinating all Compact
activities within his or her state. Id. Currently, all fifty states and the District of
Columbia participate in the Compact. See ALA. CODE §§ 44-2-20 to -26 (1991);
ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.70.010 to -.080 (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-548 to -
548.06 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-29-201 to -208 (Michie 1991); CAL. CIv.
CODE §§ 264-274 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993) (repealed effective Jan. 1, 1994;
recodified at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7900-7910 effectiveJan. 1, 1994); CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-60-1801 to -1803 (West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17a-
175 to -182 (West 1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 381-389 (1985); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 32-1041 to -1044 (Supp. 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 409.401 to -.405
(West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4-1 to -10 (Michie 1982); HAW. REV. STAT.
§§ 350E-1 to -9 (1985 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 16-2101 to -2107 (1979);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, 2601-2609 (Smith-Hurd 1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 12-
7-8-1 to -8 (West Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.158 -. 166 (West Supp.
1992); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1201 to -1206 (1986 & Supp. 1992); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 615.030- .050, .990 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. CH. C. §§ 1608-1622 (West Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§§ 4191-4247 (West 1992); MD. FAM.-LAW CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -611 (1991);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119 App., §§ 2-1 to -8 (West 1969); MICH. COMP.
LAws ANN. §§ 3.711-.717 (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.40-.48
(West 1992); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-18-1 to -17 (1981 & Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN.
STAT. §§ 210.620-.640 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 41-4-
1992] 905
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The Compact was written in the late 1950s to address growing con-
cerns about interstate adoption and foster care placement. 53 The Com-
pact is geared toward gathering information prior to placement in order
to ensure that the sending and receiving states work together to place
the child in a good environment, and toward monitoring and providing
care for the child following placement. 54 Specifically, under Article V of
the Compact, the sending state retains jurisdiction over the child "suffi-
cient to determine all matters in relation to the custody, supervision,
care, treatment, and disposition of the child . . .55
In reviewing the text of the Compact, the Third Circuit focused on
three sections, Articles II, V and VIII. 56 Article II defines the term
"placement.115 7 Article V addresses financial responsibility for the child
101 to -109 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1101 (1988); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 127.320-.350 (1986 & Supp. 1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 170-A:1-7(1990); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 9:23-5 to -17 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 32-4-1 to -7 (Michie 1989); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 374-a (McKinney 1992);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-57.1-.7 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-13-01 to -08
(1991); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5103.20-.28 (Anderson 1989); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, §§ 571-576 (West 1987); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 417.200-.260 (1991);
62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761 (Supp. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAwS §§ 40-15-1 to -10
(1990); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-7-1980 to -2080 (Law. Co-op 1985 & Supp.
1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 26-13-1 to -9 (1992); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 37-4-201 to -207 (1991); TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 45.021-.028 (West
1990 & Supp. 1992); UTAH CODE UNANN. §§ 62A-4-301 to -309 (1992); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 5901-5927 (1991); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-219.1 to -219.5(Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26-34.010 to -.080 (West 1986); W.
VA. CODE §§ 49-2A-1 to -2 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.988-.989 (West 1987
& Supp. 1992); Wvo. STAT. §§ 14-5-101 to -108 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
53. Hartfield, supra note 2, at 295; see also McComb, 934 F.2d at 479.
54. The concerns of the drafter are reflected in the purpose and policy
statement of the Compact. The Compact states:
It is the purpose and policy of the party states to cooperate with each
other in the interstate placement of children to the end that:
(a) Each child requiring placement shall receive the maximum oppor-
tunity to be placed in a suitable environment and with persons or insti-
tutions having appropriate qualifications and facilities to provide a
necessary and desirable degree and type of care.
(b) The appropriate authorities in a state where a child is to be placed
may have full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the pro-
posed placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applicable
requirements for the protection of the child.
(c) The proper authorities of the State from which the placement is
made may obtain the most complete information on the basis of which
to evaluate a projected placement before it is made.
(d) Appropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care of children
will be promoted.
62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. I (Supp. 1992).
55. Id. § 761, art. V(a).
56. McComb, 934 F.2d at 480-81.
57. Article 11(d) provides:
"Placement" means the arrangement for the care of a child in a family,
free or boarding home, or in a child-caring agency or institution but
does not include any institution caring for the mentally ill, mentally de-
906 [Vol. 37: p. 896
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following placement. 58 Article VIII outlines exclusions from the
Compact. 59
Under Article II, placement of a child is defined as the arrangement
for the care of a child in a family, but the term "family" is not defined. 60
The Third Circuit characterized the definition of "placement" as limit-
ing the Compact's application "to substitutes for parental care such as
foster care or arrangements preliminary to adoption."'6 1 The court re-
lied substantially on language in Section III which refers to placement as
"placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption." 62
Regulations adopted by the Association of Administrators, however,
specifically included habitation with the child's parent within the defini-
tion of "placement."' 63 Faced with this dichotomy, the Third Circuit
held that the regulation must yield to the statutory language. There-
fore, the court found that the regulation had no effect on the question of
whether the Compact's definition of placement includes placement of a
child with his or her natural parent. 6 4
The Third Circuit found reinforcement for its definition of place-
ment in Article V of the Compact. This article provides that the sending
fective or epileptic or any institution primarily educational in character
and any hospital or other medical facility.
62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. II(d) (Supp. 1992).
58. Article V(a) provides:
The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to
determine all matters in relation to the custody, supervision, care, treat-
ment and disposition of the child which it would have had if the child
had remained in the sending agency's state until the child is adopted,
reaches majority, becomes self-supporting, or is discharged with the
concurrence of the appropriate authority in the receiving state. Such
jurisdiction shall also include the power to effect or cause the return of
the child or its transfer to another location and custody pursuant to law.
The sending agency shall continue to have financial responsibility for
support and maintenance of the child during the period of placement.
Nothing contained herein shall defeat a claim of jurisdiction by a re-
ceiving state sufficient to deal with an act of delinquency or crime com-
mitted therein.
Id. § 761, art. V(a).
59. Article VIII(a) excludes "[t]he sending or bringing of a child into a re-
ceiving state by his parent, stepparent, grandparent, adult brother or sister,
adult uncle or aunt, or his guardian and leaving the child with any such relative
or non-agency guardian in the receiving state." Id. § 761, art. VIII(a).
60. Id. § 761, art. II(d). For the full definition of placement, see supra note
57.
61. McComb, 934 F.2d at 480.
62. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. III; McComb, 934 F.2d at 480 (court
refers to Article III language as significant and determinative).
63. McComb, 934 F.2d at 481 (citing 1 AMERICAN PUB. WELFARE ASS'N, COM-
PACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL 1.23 (1982)).
64. Id. The court explained: "[I]n any conflict between a statute and a reg-
ulation purporting to implement the statutes [sic] provision, the regulation
must, of course, give way." Id. (quoting Tiani v. Commonwealth, 486 A.2d
1016, 1017 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985)).
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state must maintain jurisdiction over the child, including "financial re-
sponsibility for support and maintenance of the child during the period
of placement."'6 5 The Third Circuit reasoned that construing the return
of a child to his or her natural parent as a placement would lead to the
anomalous result that a sending state's duty to support a child would
supersede the traditional duty of a natural parent to support his or her
child.6 6
In McComb, the Third Circuit also relied on Article VIII of the Com-
pact to further support its holding that the return of a child to his or her
natural parent is not a "placement" within the terms of the Compact.
Article VIII excludes placement of a child by a "parent, stepparent,
grandparent, adult brother or sister, adult aunt or uncle, or [] guardian"
with a "relative or non-agency guardian."'6 7 The draftsman's notes for
the Compact indicate that this exclusion "exempt[ed] certain close rela-
tives ... in order to protect the social and legal rights of the family []
because it [was] recognized that regulation is desirable only in the ab-
sence of adequate family control." 68 Thus, the Third Circuit inter-
preted Article VIII as implying that the term "placement" referred to
placement with a substitute for a child's natural family. 69 In McComb, of
course, Khemsu's placement was not with a substitute family, but rather
with his natural family; consequently, the court refused to apply the
compact to a situation that was not a "substitute arrangement[ ] for pa-
rental care.". 70
Finally, the Third Circuit relied on the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction Act (UCCJA) to buttress its decision to limit the scope of the
Compact. 7 ' The court indicated that the UCCJA would have allowed
the Virginia court to order investigation of the Walton home, require
65. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. V(a). The Third Circuit noted that
a sending state's failure to provide continuing support can terminate its jurisdic-
tion over the child. McComb, 934 F.2d at 480 (citing Florida Dep't of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs. v. Thornton, 396 S.E.2d 475, 480 (W. Va. 1990)).
66. McComb, 934 F.2d at 480.
67. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. VIII(a).
68. McComb, 934 F.2d at 481 (quoting Draftsman's Notes on Interstate Compact
on the Placement of Children, reprinted in R. HUNT, OBSTACLES TO INTERSTATE ADOP-
TION 44 (1972)).
69. Id. at 482. The Third Circuit stated: "We are persuaded that read as a
whole the Compact was intended only to govern placing children in substitute
arrangements for parental care." Id. The court found that this interpretation
"avoid[ed] entanglement with the natural rights of families [and] is consistent
with the limited circumstances that justify a state's interference with family life."
Id. at 481 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (overturning
East Cleveland housing ordinance restricting occupancy in dwelling unit to sin-
gle family and limiting definition of family to nuclear family)).
70. Id. at 482. Khemsu was returned to the custody of his natural mother.
Id. at 477.
71. Id. at 482. The Third Circuit relied on three sections of the Penn-
sylvania UCCJA statute: 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5354 (recognition of out-
of-state custody decrees), 5360 (hearings and studies in another state; orders to
908
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Pennsylvania courts to recognize the Virginia court order, and enforce
the supervision requested by the Virginia court.72
As a result of its analysis of the text of the Compact, the Third Cir-
cuit held that the Compact does not apply when a child is returned to his
or her natural parent residing in another state. 73 Thus, the McComb
court found that the Virginia court could not maintain jurisdiction over
Khemsu's case under the Compact once he was returned to his natural
mother.7 4 Without jurisdiction over Khemsu's case, the Virginia court
could not create any special relationship between Khemsu and the Phila-
delphia defendants. 75 Therefore, because the special relationship ex-
ception to the DeShaney rule was inapplicable to Khemsu's case, he could
not obtain a remedy under DeShaney for the harm that was inflicted upon
him by a private actor. 76
IV. CONCLUSION
A. The Compact Should Cover Placement of a Child with His or Her Natural
Parent
The Third Circuit's holding is a strict reading of the Compact. In-
terpreting the Compact to include the placement of a child with his or
her natural parent, however, would best ensure that a child is placed in a
suitable environment, which, after all, is the main purpose of the Com-
pact. In addition, such a reading would conform to the dictate of Article
X of the Compact, which requires that "[t]he provisions of this compact
shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes thereof."'7 7
Placement of a child with his or her natural parent is not explicitly
excluded from the scope of the Compact by Article VIII. 78 Instead, Ar-
ticle VIII only excludes placement by a parent with a relative or non-
agency guardian. 79 McComb, however, involved placement by a state with
appear), and 5361 (assistance to courts of other states) (Supp. 1991). See Mc-
Comb, 934 F.2d at 482.
72. McComb, 934 F.2d at 482. For criticism of the Third Circuit's reliance
on the UCCJA, see infra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
73. McComb, 934 F.2d at 482.
74. Id.
75. Id. The McComb court opined that "because the Interstate Compact did
not apply in this case, the Compact and the Virginia court order together were
not effective in Pennsylvania and did not create a special relationship between
Khemsu and the defendants." Id. The court noted that the Virginia court order
by itself could not impose any legal duties on the Philadelphia defendants that
could have established the necessary special relationship between the Philadel-
phia defendants and Khemsu. Id.
76. Id. For a discussion of the DeShaney special relationship exception, see
supra notes 33-37 & 45-47.
77. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. X (Supp. 1992).
78. Id. § 761, art. VIII. For the text of Article VIII(a), see supra note 59.
79. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. VIII. In a 1982 letter opinion, the
Attorney General of North Carolina indicated that the Article VIII limitation
"simply does not apply" to the placement of a child with his or her natural par-
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/11
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
a parent. In this situation, a state, not a relative, would be making the
placement. Thus the intra-family placement concerns contemplated by
Article VIII would not be implicated.
Furthermore, the Compact regulations strengthen the argument
that the Compact addresses the placement of a child with his or her nat-
ural parent. Regulation III states that " 'placement' as defined in Article
II(d) includes the arrangement for the care of a child in the home of his
parent ... when the sending agency is any entity other than a parent,
relative, or non-agency guardian ...."80 The McComb court, however,
perceived an inconsistency between Article 11(d) and the Compact's reg-
ulations and therefore concluded that "[a] regulation cannot be upheld
if it is contrary to the statute under which it was promulgated."-8'
Whether the regulation is "contrary to the statute," however, hinges on
the definition of the term "family" as it is used in Article II.
In Article II, placement is defined, in part, as "the arrangement for
the care of a child in a family."'82 A basic tenet of statutory interpreta-
tion is that words are to be given their plain meaning.83 Certainly the
plain meaning of the word family includes a person's natural family. 84
Moreover, the Compact's definition of placement as an arrangement for
the care of a child in a family does not exempt the child's natural family
from its scope.8 5 Additionally, although the duty for financial responsi-
bility found within Article V appears on its face to conflict with the cus-
tomary duty of parental care, one can argue that the Article V
requirements supplement, rather than supplant, normal parental re-
sponsibilities. 86 The regulation, therefore, is not necessarily contrary to
ent. "In order for that limitation to apply, the child must be both sent and received
by a parent, relative or guardian." 52 Op. N.C. Att'y Gen. 22 (1982) (emphasis
added).
80. McComb, 934 F.2d at 481 (citing 1 AMERICAN PUB. WELFARE Ass'N, COM-
PACT ADMINISTRATORS' MANUAL 1.23 (1982)). This regulation was adopted by
the Association of Administrators of the Compact in its administrative manual,
which was published in 1982.
81. Id. (quoting Consulting Eng'rs Council v. State Architects Licensure
Bd., 560 A.2d 1375, 1376 (Pa. 1989)).
82. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. 1(d).
83. See Semasek v. Semasek, 502 A.2d 109, 111 (Pa. 1985) ("Words must be
given their plain meaning ....").
84. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 604 (6th ed. 1990) (family "[m]ost commonly
refers to group of persons consisting of parents and children").
85. See 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. II(d) (placement means "the
arrangement for the care of a child in a family, free or boarding home, or in a
child-caring agency or institution. ). For the text of Article II(d), see supra
note 57.
86. See 61 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 535 (1979). In a 1979 letter opinion, the
attorney general and deputy attorney general of California recognized that natu-
ral parents bear "the primary responsibility for financial support of a child." Id.
They concluded, however, that Article V was not inconsistent with this responsi-
bility because "parental support, to the extent it can be procured affords a po-
tential for diminishing the public support supplied by the sending agency." Id.;
[Vol. 37: p. 896910
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the articles of the Compact.
Thus, the question becomes whether the provisions of Article III
are sufficient indication to support a finding that placement with a natu-
ral parent is excluded from the Compact's reach. Article III focuses on
the conditions that must be satisfied before a child may be placed in a
family.8 7 Specifically, Article III requires that the sending agency com-
ply with every requirement set out in the Compact.88 One such require-
ment is that "[e]ach child requiring placement shall receive the
maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment .... -89
When a state has taken custody of a child from a natural parent, the
natural home arguably was not a suitable environment. By allowing a
state to monitor a child following the child's return to a natural home,
the Compact enables the sending state to ensure that the child has, in
fact, been placed in a suitable environment. An express purpose of the
Compact is therefore fulfilled, as required by Article III. This result is
stronger evidence of the Compact's meaning and of its application to a
child's placement with his or her natural parent than an implied exclu-
sion of natural parents under Article 111.90
Moreover, in McComb, the Third Circuit acknowledged that under
see also Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 88-4 (1988) (interpreting Article V as applying only
to foster care and adoption, but not to placement with natural parent); Op. Oh.
Att'y Gen. 89-092 (1989) (Article V imposes financial responsibility on sending
state for payment of child's out-of-state public school tuition where child sent to
live with relative in another state).
For a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of Article V and its
impact, see supra notes 65-66.
87. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. III.
88. Id. § 761, art. III(a). Article 111(a) provides: "No sending agency shall
send, bring or cause to be sent or brought into any other party state, any child
for placement in foster care or as a preliminary to a possible adoption unless the
sending agency shall comply with each and every requirement set forth in this
article .. " Id. Article III(b) uses similar language regarding the conditions a
receiving state must meet. Id. § 761, art. III(b).
89. Id. § 761, art. I(a).
90. Under Pennsylvania law, statutes are required to be construed in order
to give meaning to the legislative intent. 1 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1921 (Supp.
1992). Interpretation of the Compact is somewhat different, however, because
the Compact was drafted by a group of social service administrators, rather than
a state legislature. See HARTFIELD, supra note 2, at 295. This fact, however, pro-
vides a greater incentive for giving weight to the regulations promulgated by the
Compact administrators given their more specialized knowledge of the develop-
ment and focus of the Compact. In fact, Pennsylvania courts advocate "that in-
terpretations of a statute of an administrative agency charged with its
administration are entitled to great weight." Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Work-
men's Compensation Appeal Bd., 586 A.2d 500, 502 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991)
(citing Boeing Vertol Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 528 A.2d
1029 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987)). Administrative interpretations, however, can be
ignored if the interpretation is "clearly incorrect." Id. In fact, in McComb, the
Third Circuit concluded that the Compact Administrator's regulation was "of no
effect." McComb, 934 F.2d at 481.
1992]
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limited circumstances a state may interfere in family life.9 1 The Third
Circuit's decision, however, adds a new dimension to the old Supreme
Court pronouncement that "[tihe fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents .... 92
Although the Third Circuit conceded that the Compact was designed to
apply in the absence of natural family control, 9 3 it refused to recognize
that prior, known improper care of a child by his or her natural parent
could rise to the level of absence of natural family control. 9 4
B. Inapplicability of the UCCJA
Rather than considering the absence of natural family control in the
Walton home, the Third Circuit relied on the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) to strengthen its decision to limit the scope of
the Compact. 9 5 The UCCJA is an interstate compact that focuses on the
jurisdictional aspects of interstate custody questions.9 6 Therefore, it
can be an important supplement to the Compact, as recognized by the
91. McComb, 934 F.2d at 481 (citing Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494
(1977)).
92. Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 482. The Third Circuit's refusal to recognize Walton's prior mis-
treatment of her children as evidence of no natural family control is implicit in
the McComb court's lack of attention to Walton's previous loss of custody of her
children due to the malnutrition of all five children. Id. at 476.
95. Id. at 482. Immediately prior to its conclusion that the Compact did not
apply to the placement of a child with a natural parent, the McComb court stated:
Both Virginia and Pennsylvania have adopted the Uniform [Child
Custody Jurisdiction] Act. Its provisions would have allowed the Penn-
sylvania courts to order an investigation of the conditions at the Walton
home on request of the Virginia court. The Act would have required
Pennsylvania courts to recognize the Virginia court order and also
would have permitted the Pennsylvania courts to enforce the supervi-
sion requested by the Virginia court.
Id. (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5354, 5360-5361 (1986) current revsion at
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5354, 5360-5361 (Supp. 1992)).
96. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5341-5366 (Supp. 1992); see also In re
Schomer, 411 N.E.2d 554, 558 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) ("[I]t is clear that the only
purpose of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act is the determination of
the proper forum for the trial of a custody dispute."); EMANUEL A. BERTIN, PENN-
SYLVANIA CHILD CUSTODY LAW, PRACTICE, AND PROCEDURE § 1.9 (1983 & Supp.
1991) (UCCJA provides restrictions on courts prior to assertion ofjurisdiction
over custody dispute); PATRICIA M. HorF ET AL., INTERSTATE CHILD CUSTODY
DISPUTES AND PARENTAL KIDNAPPING: POLICY, PRACTICE AND LAw 1-3 to 1-6, 2-
29 to 2-30 (1982) (UCCJA designed as procedural statute to reduce custody fo-
rum shopping, repetitive litigation and parental kidnapping; actual custody dis-
position is matter of state substantive law); Christopher L. Blakesley, Child
Custody-Jurisdiction and Procedure, 35 EMORY L.J. 291, 293-96 (1986) (discussing
UCCJA and Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act as legislative responses tojuris-
dictional issues historically problematic in child custody area).
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McComb court.9 7 For example, the UCCJA provides that a court with
jurisdiction over a child may request that a court of another member
state conduct a study of the child's proposed home.9 8 Additionally, the
UCCJA requires that a member state's courts recognize and enforce out-
of-state custody decrees.9 9 Both Pennsylvania and Virginia are party
states to this act.' 0 0 As a result, the investigation of the Walton home
conducted prior to Khemsu's custody hearing could have been per-
formed under the UCCJA provision.' 0 ' Furthermore, the custody de-
cree returning Khemsu to Walton would have been enforceable under
the UCCJA. 10 2
The Third Circuit's reliance on the UCCJA, however, is misplaced
with respect to one key issue: the UCCJA does not address the ongoing
monitoring of a child after final custody is granted. 10 3 Rather, the
UCCJA is designed to facilitate communication between courts and pre-
97. McComb, 934 F.2d at 482. The McComb court described the UCCJA as
"an alternative source of assistance when interstate jurisdictional concerns are
present." Id.
98. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5360. A court with jurisdiction over a child
"may request the appropriate court of another state to hold a hearing to adduce
evidence .... or to have social studies made with respect to the custody of a
child." Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-142 (Michie 1990) (same). Virginia had
appropriate jurisdiction under the UCCJA because it was Khemsu's "home
state" for the purposes of Walton's custody request. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-
125 to -126(1) (proving grounds for jurisdiction).
99. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5354, 5356(a). Section 5354, entitled
"Recognition of out-of-state custody decrees," requires that "[t]he courts of this
Commonwealth shall recognize and enforce an initial or modification decree of a
court of another state which had assumed jurisdiction custody." Id. § 5354.
Section 5356(a), entitled "Filing and enforcement of custody decree of another
state," provides that a properly filed custody decree of another state "has the
same effect and shall be enforced in like manner as a custody decree rendered by
a court of this Commonwealth." Id. § 5356(a).
100. See id. §§ 5341-5366; VA. CODE ANN. 88 20-125 to -146.
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-142 (court with jurisdiction over child may re-
quest social studies or require member state to hold evidence hearing). Investi-
gations of the Walton home conducted prior to Khemsu's custody hearing,
however, were requested and performed under the terms of the Compact. Mc-
Comb, 934 F.2d at 476-77.
102. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5354 (state court shall recognize and en-
force custody decrees of court of another state having proper jurisdiction). Both
the Virginia court and the Pennsylvania authorities treated the custody grant of
Khemsu to Walton as a placement under the terms of the Compact. McComb,
934 F.2d at 477. Pennsylvania accepted the legality of the Virginia custody or-
der by approving the placement request. Id.
103. See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5341-5366. The Third Circuit has
termed the UCCJA an "avowedly jurisdictional statute." Lehman v. Lycoming
County Children's Servs. Agency, 648 F.2d 135, 175 (3d Cir. 1981) (Adams,
C.J., concurring). One commentator has agreed, noting: "The Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA") is a jurisdictional statute and is not in-
tended to directly address the substantive issues in a custody case." HOFF ET AL.,
supra note 96, at 2-1.
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vent forum shopping and duplicative litigation.10 4 The UCCJA was not
enacted to provide a vehicle for ongoing supervision of final child cus-
tody arrangements. 10 5 Thus, the Third Circuit's perceived alternative
remedy for the heart-wrenching facts of McComb does not exist.
C. The Road Ahead
Over a decade ago, a judge on the Third Circuit noted that "[t]he
family relationship, whose origin is entirely independent of the state and
whose rights are older than the Constitution itself, has been an unend-
ing source of sensitive legal problems."' 1 6 This certainly remains true
with respect to the interstate placement of children with their natural
parents. In McComb, the Third Circuit considered the intrusion into a
natural family unit and the state's proper parens patriae role and chose to
limit a state's power in the area of interstate placement of children.
Suspected child abuse is always a sensitive legal issue that requires
the state to walk a fine line between intrusion into a family's life and
protection of the child. In a sense, with its holding in McComb, the Third
Circuit has made that walk a little easier for states by removing any state
responsibility for ongoing monitoring of a child once custody is re-
turned to the natural parent.
In another way, however, the Third Circuit has increased the bur-
104. Blakesley, supra note 96, at 303. Emanuel Bertin describes the UCCJA
as stemming the " 'grab, run, and file' tactics [used] by parents wary of the ex-
pense, or unsatisfied with the results, of pursuing proper legal channels." BER-
TIN, supra note 96, at § 1.9.
105. HOFF ET AL., supra note 96, at 2-29. These authors note that "[o]nce
jurisdiction is determined to exist in a particular state pursuant to the UCCJA,
the substantive laws of that state govern the actual custody disposition. In-
cluded within the state substantive law is the Interstate Compact on the Place-
ment of Children." Id. They also believe that the Compact is applicable to
"placements with parents and relatives when the placement is made by an
agency other than a parent or relative." Id. at 2-28.
If the UCCJA is stretched to permit monitoring of a child as part of enforc-
ing a custody order, the UCCJA would extend farther beyond its scope than it
would if the Compact was interpreted as addressing placement with a child's
natural parent. Comments to the UCCJA sections relied upon by the Third Cir-
cuit reinforce this point. The Third Circuit relied on three sections of the Penn-
sylvania UCCJA statute: 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5354 (recognition of out-
of-state custody decrees), 5360 (hearings and studies in another state; orders to
appear), and 5361 (assistance to courts of other states). See McComb, 934 F.2d at
482. The comments concerning recognition of out-of-state decrees indicate that
this section is designed to "provide[] a simplified and speedy method of enforce-
ment." UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT § 15 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 311 (1988).
Comments regarding hearings in another state and assistance to other courts
indicate that these sections are geared towards pre-custody trial investigation.
Id, § 19 cmt., § 20 cmt. (discussing, inter alia, admissibility of social studies).
More specifically, "[tihey are designed to fill the partial vacuum which inevitably
exists in cases involving an 'interstate child' since part of the essential informa-
tion about the child ...is always in another state." Id. § 18 cmt., at 318. The
comments do not discuss ongoing monitoring.
106. Lehman, 648 F.2d at 146 (Adams, C.J., concurring).
[Vol. 37: p. 896
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den on states that wish to provide adequate protection to children
placed in potentially abusive situations. Prior to the McComb decision,
when a child was returned to a natural parent through interestate cus-
tody channels, the receiving state was put on notice of the placement
and was thus made aware of a potentially sensitive family situation. The
Compact also required monitoring of the placment home and thus gave
states a legal means by which to oversee the child's situaiton and to step
in when necessary for the protection of the child.' 0 7 Following the Mc-
Comb decision, the placed child no longer has this legal safety net. In-
stead, a child who is returned to a natural parent must rely on the basic
protection of a state's social welfare system. Accordingly, for a state to
offer the same basic degree of protection for those children as it does for
children placed in foster homes, it must be more vigilant in identifying
problems and finding the means by which to cure them. Cases like Mc-
Comb and DeShaney, however, indicate that such vigilance is very difficult
to achieve. '0 8
One of the main purposes of the Compact is to ensure that each
child "receive the maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable envi-
ronment."' 1 9 This purpose is undermined by the Third Circuit's hold-
ing in McComb. Without the Compact's protection in the form of
ongoing monitoring, a child moved in interstate custody to a natural
parent must rely on the basic protections of the receiving state's social
services department or on a possible application of the UCCJA. The
social services department protection, however, is a limited safeguard
against child abuse given its reactive versus proactive design. Further-
more, any available procedural protections of the UCCJA must be
stretched unnaturally by courts in order to include ongoing monitoring
107. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761 (Supp. 1992). As illustrated by the
facts of McComb, however, the fact that a legal means to protect the child exists
does not guarantee that a child will be protected.
An opinion by the Nevada attorney general addressed the benefits of pro-
viding a legal means for protective monitoring. See Op. Nev. Att'y Gen. 88-4
(1988). The attorney general had before him a situation involving placement of
a child with a non-resident father who had not had physical custody of the child
for several years. Id. Unlike McComb, there was no history of past abuse by the
father that would have created a special cause for concern. Id. Nonetheless, the
attorney general opined that the Compact applied because "in order to safe-
guard the physical and mental well-being of a child . . .it is necessary that the
court retain jurisdiction over the child so that it may require the child's return if
something is wrong in the parent's home." Id.
108. In both McComb and DeShaney, social workers were aware of potential
problems in the child's natural home, but they could not stop the ensuing paren-
tal abuse. See McComb, 934 F.2d at 476-77; DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191-93 (1989). The odds of discovering
and curing abuse are far worse when authorities are not even aware of potential
problems.
109. 62 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 761, art. I(a).
1992] 915
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requirements. "10
One of the key elements of any interstate compact is uniformity in
interpretation." 'I Uniformity, however, is lacking with respect to the is-
sue of whether the Compact applies to the placement of a child with a
natural parent, although most courts that have addressed the issue hold
that such placement is covered by the Compact." 2 Interpreting the In-
terstate Compact on the Placement of Children to include the placement
of a child with his or her natural parent would ensure that the main
purposes of the Compact are achieved, that is, that a child is placed in a
suitable environment with proper monitoring and support.
Kimberly M. Butler
110. For a discussion of the procedural nature of the UCCJA, see supra
notes 95-105.
111. Hartfield, supra note 2, at 293 ("conflicting decisions undermine the
uniformity the [Compact] was designed to achieve"). The McComb court was
mindful of the need for uniformity. McComb, 934 F.2d at 479.
112. For a discussion of the conflicting case law on the issue of whether the
Compact applies to the placement of a child with his or her natural parent, see
supra note 51.
One possible solution to this confusion would be to amend the Compact
and add a definition of "family." One of the weaknesses of interstate compacts,
however, is their inflexibility. HARDY, supra note 52, at 21. Revision of a com-
pact is especially difficult when the compact does not provide for amendment.
Id. The Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children does not have a spe-
cific amendment procedure. As a result, an apparently simple definition amend-
ment could take years to accomplish. Id.
916 [Vol. 37: p. 896
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